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"Essentially	made	of	information":	concepts	and	implications	of	informational	privacy	
	
David	Bawden	and	Lyn	Robinson	
Department	of	Library	and	Information	Science	
City,	University	of	London	
United	Kingdom	
		
Abstract	
Introduction.		
This	paper	presents	an	approach	to	a	conceptual	understanding	of	privacy	issues,	rooted	in	
Luciano	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information	and	information	ethics.	It	draws	from	Floridi's	
ideas	of	ontological	information	privacy,	in	combination	with	other	frameworks.		
Methods	
Qualitative	conceptual	analysis	of	a	set	of	material	found	by	a	comprehensive	search	for	
articles	and	books	discussing	Floridi's	informational	privacy,	and	a	selective	search	for	
related	relevant	materials;	sources	used	were	Web	of	Science,	Library	and	Information	
Science	and	Technology	Abstracts,	and	Google	Scholar.	A	detailed	evaluation	of	Floridi's	
ideas	of	informational	privacy	within	his	philosophy	of	information,	and	a	comparison	with	
other	informational	privacy	models,	leads	to	an	analysis	of	their	applicability	to	research	and	
practice	in	the	library	and	information	sciences.	
Results	
There	are	five	major	considerations:	each	person	is	constituted	by	their	information,	so	that	
informational	privacy	is	fundamental,	overlaying	other	privacy	type;	breach	of	informational	
privacy	is	an	aggression	against	personal	identity	and	self-development,	and	hence	
protection	of	privacy	should	be	based	directly	on	the	protection	of	human	dignity;	explicit	
protection	for	group	privacy	is	as	important	as	for	individual	privacy;	digital	technologies	can	
both	defend	and	damage	privacy,	and	can	also	change	our	understanding	of	it;	information	
friction,	anonymity,	and	obscurity	are	key	concepts.	
Conclusions	
Floridi's	conception	of	privacy,	within	his	philosophy	of	information,	offers,	in	our	view,	the	
best	basis	for	developing	information	privacy	as	a	field	of	research,	study,	and	practice	
within	the	library/information	disciplines	and	professions.	Suggestions	for	future	research	
include:	formulation	of	LIS	privacy	issues	in	terms	of	Floridi's	conception,	to	assess	its	value;	
introduction	of	information	privacy	concepts	into	models	of	information	behaviour	and	
information	literacy;	investigation	of	quantitative	and	semi-quantitative	privacy	modelling,	
based	on	a	formal	analysis	of	informational	frictions.	
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Introduction	
	
'Each	of	us	...	is	a	fragile	and	very	pliable	entity,	whose	life	is	essentially	made	of	
information	...	only	within	a	philosophy	of	information	that	sees	human	nature	as	
constituted	by	informational	patterns	do	breaches	of	privacy	have	an	ontological	
impact'	(Luciano	Floridi,	2016,	pp.310-311).	
	
'We	[...]	have	a	private	life	[and]	hold	it	infinitely	the	dearest	of	our	possessions'	
(Virgina	Woolf,	2002,	58)	
		
'Any	society	in	which	no	informational	privacy	is	possible	is	one	in	which	no	personal	
identity	can	be	maintained'	(Luciano	Floridi,	2006,	p.111).	
	
The	protection	of	privacy,	which	the	information	philosopher	Luciano		Floridi	has	denoted	as	
'one	of	the	defining	issues	of	hyperhistorical	time'	(Floridi	2014,	102)	is	an	increasingly	
important	part	of	the	remit	of	the	library/information	disciplines.	The	quest	for	ways	to	
preserve	privacy,	while	not	impeding	open	and	efficient	access	to,	and	use	of,	information	
and	data	is	a	major	challenge	for	legislators,	regulators	and	the	digital	economy	and	society	
which	is	increasingly	urgent	and	important.					
	
One	response	has	been	for	library/information	institutions	and	organisations	in	a	variety	of	
contexts	to	design	privacy	policies	appropriate	to	their	situation.	Some	typical	examples	are:	
• the	International	Federation	of	Library	Associations	statement	on	privacy	in	the	
library	environment	(IFLA	2015)	
• privacy	guidelines	from	the	American	Library	Association	for	a	variety	of	specific	
contexts,	such	as	e-book	lending,	library	websites,	and	library	management	systems	
(ALA	206)	
• a	UK	guide	to	privacy	for	public	library	staff	(Charillon	2018)	
• a	statement	on	patron	privacy	with	respect	to	digital	resource	access	from	a	US	
academic	library	(Calter	2019)	
• a	suggested	model	for	how	information	professionals	in	general,	and	public	
librarians	in	particular,	may	guard	their	patrons'	privacy,	devised	by	the	Chief	
Executive	of	CILIP,	the	UK	library	and	information	professional	association	(Poole	
2017)	
• the	privacy	policy	statement	for	the	Chemical	Abstracts	Service	(CAS	2019)	
• the	privacy	policy	for	the	Google	search	engine	(Google	2019).	
		
However,	privacy	is	a	complex	and	contested	concept,	whose	very	nature	changes	as	
information	and	communication	technologies	become	more	pervasive	and	omnipresent.	A	
clear	understanding	of	the	issues	in	general	conceptual	terms,	as	well	as	in	the	detail	of	the	
local	context,	is	a	prerequisite	for	effective	action.	While	some	of	the	current	privacy	
policies	are	rooted	in	wider	principles	-	the	IFLA	privacy	statement,	for	example,	being	
based	in	the	IFLA	Code	of	Ethics,	and	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	of	which	
article	12	mentions	privacy	-	they	are	generally	pragmatic,	and	responsive	to	perceived	local	
pressures	and	problems.	
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Although	there	has	been	research	and	analysis	within	the	library/information	discipline	on	
issues	of	privacy,	it	would	benefit	the	discipline	and	profession	to	have	a	clear	and	rigorous	
framework	for	privacy	issues,	with	which	to	unite	the	various	opinions	and	perspectives	into	
something	which	can	be	readily	understood,	communicated	and	carried	forward	into	
practice.	Buschman	(2016)	argues	for	a	broader	theoretical	understanding	of	privacy	as	a	
support	to	action	by	the	library/information	professions;	if	not	exactly	a	lone	voice,	he	is	
certainly	one	of	few.	Wu,	Vitak	and	Zimmer	(2019)	advocate	a	research	programme	for	
information	privacy,	based	on	the	privacy	conceptualization	of	Westin	(1967).	
	
For	an	early	example	of	the	application	of	various	privacy	theories	and	frameworks	to	policy	
development,	in	the	specific	case	of	the	ethics	of	big	data,	see	Mittelstadt	and	Floridi	
(2016A);	see	also	Rønn	and	Søe	(2019),	who	apply	the	privacy	model	of	Tavani	to	issues	of	
social	media	privacy,	and	McMeneny	(2017),	who	uses	Nissenbaum's	privacy	framework	as	
a	guide	for	privacy	policies	in	libraries.	
	
This	paper	presents	an	approach	to	a	conceptual	understanding	of	privacy	issues,	rooted	in	
Luciano	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information	and	information	ethics.	It	draws	from	Floridi's	
ideas	of	ontological	information	privacy,	in	combination	with	other	frameworks.	It	is	based	
on	conceptual	analysis	of	a	set	of	material	found	by	a	comprehensive	search	for	articles	and	
books	discussing	Floridi's	informational	privacy,	and	a	selective	search	for	related	relevant	
materials;	sources	used	were	Web	of	Science,	Library	and	Information	Science	and	
Technology	Abstracts,	and	Google	Scholar.	
	
Privacy:	informational	and	otherwise	
Privacy	is	a	deceptively	simple	concept.	We	feel	that	we	intuitively	know	when	we	have	it,	
and	when	we	have	lost	it,	understanding	is,	as	in	the	main	Oxford	dictionary	definitions,	as	
'a	state	in	which	one	is	not	observed	or	disturbed	by	other	people'	or	'the	state	of	being	free	
from	public	attention'.	It	is	often	regarded	as	being	a	right,	and	has	a	long	history	of	being	
seen	as	the	'right	to	be	let	alone'	(Warren	and	Brandeis,	1890).		
	
However,	privacy	is	in	reality	a	complex	and	contested	concept,	even	aside	from	the	issues	
introduced	by	digital	information	systems	(Wacks,	2015;	DeCew	2018):	'The	term	"privacy"	
is	used	frequently	in	ordinary	language,	as	well	as	in	philosophical,	political	and	legal	
discussion,	yet	there	is	no	single	definition	or	analysis	of	meaning	of	the	term.'	(DeCew	
(2019,	1).		Studies	of	the	concept	in	a	variety	of	disciplines	have	produced	numerous	
definitions,	concepts,	frameworks,	and	models	for	comprehending	privacy	in	myriad	
settings.	A	search	in	Web	of	Science	(1970-2019)	for	the	phrases	'privacy	model'	or	'privacy	
framework'	yields	over	400	references;	see	Tavani	(2007,	2008A),	Bélanger	and	Crossler	
(2011),	and	Mulligan,	Koopman	and	Doty	(2016)	for	reviews	of	some	of	these.	However,	as	
Bélanger	and	Crossler	were	among	the	first	to	point	out,	most	theorising	and	conceptual	
analysis	of	privacy	has	been	carried	out	in	very	specific	contexts,	and	for	very	particular	
groups,	rather	than	being	grounded	in	broader	principles.	
		
Of	these	privacy	frameworks	and	models,	we	may	note	a	number	of	being	of	potential	value	
to	issues	of	privacy	in	a	library/information	context,	for	example:		
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• Privacy	typologies,	of	which	there	are	many.	One	of	the	seemingly	most	useful	is	that	
devised	by	Koops,	Newell,	Timan,	Škorvánek,	Chokrevski	and	Galič	(2017).	Working	
in	the	legal	context,	they	classify	privacy	in	two	dimensions:	the	context,	from	purely	
personal	to	fully	public,	and	the	emphasis,	from	'freedom	from'	(being	let	alone)	to	
'freedom	to'	(self-development).	On	this	basis,	they	identify	eight	basic	privacy	
types:	bodily	privacy,	spatial	privacy,	communicational	privacy,	proprietary	privacy,	
intellectual	privacy,	decisional	privacy,	associational	privacy,	and	behavioural	
privacy.	Informational	privacy	appears	as	a	ninth	type,	which	overlaps,	but	does	not	
coincide	exactly	with,	the	other	eight	types.	Mulligan,	Koopman	and	Doty	(2016)	
analyse	privacy	in	an	analogous	way,	using	the	dimensions	of	theory	(what	kind	of	
entities	are	included),	protection,	harm,	provision,	and	scope,	though	without	using	
these	to	generate	explicit	privacy	types.	Tavani	(2008A)	recommends	a	four-fold	
typology,	distinguishing	physical/accessibility,	decisional,	psychological/mental,	and	
informational	privacies.	
		
• The	multidimensional	analysis	of	privacy	mapping	due	to	Mulligan,	Koopman	and	
Doty	(2016)	draws	from	the	idea	that	privacy	is,	and	will	always	be	a	contested	
concept,	multi-faceted	and	open-ended,	mutable	according	to	changing	
technological	and	societal	conditions,	and	applicable	in	different	ways	for	different	
contexts	and	uses.	
	
• Nissenbaum’s	(2010,	2011)	framework	of	contextual	integrity	critically	relates	
privacy	issues	to	the	social	context.	Flows	of	personal	information	are	modelled	
using	context-relative	informational	norms,	of	which	the	key	parameters	are	actors	
(senders,	recipients,	data	subjects),	attributes	(types	of	information),	and	
transmission	principles	(constraints	on	information	flows).	This	approach	seems	to	
have	an	immediate	appeal	for	the	library/information	context,	as	its	structure	is	
reminiscent	of	some	widely-used	information	behaviour	models.	Indeed,	it	has	been	
used	in	a	privacy	briefing	for	UK	information	professionals	(McMenemy	2017).	
	
• Mai's	datafication	model	of	big	data	privacy	(2016).	This	includes	the	processing	of	
data	as	well	as	the	collection	of	data	as	a	major	issue	for	privacy	in	the	digital	age,	
and	one	with	which	regulation	and	legislation	struggle	to	keep	up.	
	
• Primiero's	more	formal	theory	of	information	privacy	(2016).	This	gives	an	axiomatic	
theory,	with	precise	definitions	and	rules,	for	concepts	such	as	information	access,	
information	gap,	information	flow,	and	network	friction,	making	possible	a	formal	
and	quantitative	analysis	of	privacy	risks	and	harms,	which	may	be	tested	and	
verified	empirically.	
	
Floridi's	philosophy	of	information	and	its	relevance	to	the	information	sciences	
Luciano	Floridi	has	developed	a	comprehensive	philosophical	approach	to	information	in	all	
its	manifestations,	which	he	states	combines	both	the	analytical	and	continental	
philosophical	traditions.	It	is	set	out	in	three	monographs:	The	philosophy	of	information	
(2011A),	Information	Ethics	(2013),	and	The	logic	of	information	(2019).	These	will	be	joined	
in	the	future	by	a	fourth	and	final	volume,	The	politics	of	information,	to	make	a	tetralogy	
which	Floridi	has	termed	Principia	Philosophiae	Informationis.	There	are	also	two	texts,	
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more	accessible	for	those	without	a	strong	philosophical	background:	Information:	a	very	
short	introduction	(2010),	and	The	fourth	revolution	(2014).	Supporting	these	books	is	a	
large	number	of	chapters	and	articles.	It	is	an	ambitious	project,	and	the	only	such	all-
embracing	philosophical	and	conceptual	approach	to	information	available	today.	The	
previous	candidates	have	been	the	social	epistemology	pioneered	by	librarians	Jesse	Shera	
and	Margaret	Egan,	and	Popper's	three	world	ontology,	heralded	by	Brookes	(1980)	as	a	
foundation	for	information	science.	Neither	has	gained	wide	acceptance	within	the	
library/information	disciplines;	we	may	note	that	Floridi	has	argued	against	social	
epistemology	as	a	suitable	basis	for	librarianship	(Floridi,	2002),	while	remarking	on	
Popper's	ideas	as	a	stimulus	for	the	development	of	his	philosophy	of	information	(Floridi,	
2019,	p.95).	
	
It	is	not	therefore	surprising	that	Floridi's	philosophy	has	been	examined	as	a	possible	
contender	for	providing	theoretical	and	conceptual	underpinning	for	the	library	and	
information	sciences.	The	was	introduced	by	Herold	(2001),	in	a	wide-ranging	survey	of	
theories	and	philosophies	of	information	which	might	have	some	relation	to	librarianship,	
and	developed	by	Floridi	himself,	in	papers	proposing	that	library	and	information	science	
should	be	regarded	as	applied	philosophy	of	information	(Floridi,	2002,	2004).	This	proved	a	
controversial	suggestion,	attracting	both	support	and	criticism	over	the	years;	see	Bawden	
and	Robinson	(2018A)	for	a	summary	of	the	debate,	and	for	various	perspectives	see	Ess	
(2009),	Furner	(2010),	Fyffe	(2015)	and	Van	der	Veer	Martens	(2015,	2017).	The	debate	
continues,	in	a	multi-authored	critical	review	provoked	by	the	recent	publication	of	The	
logic	of	information	(Gorichanaz,	Furner,	Ma,	Bawden,	Robinson,	Dixon,	Herold,	Obelitz	Søe,	
Van	der	Veer	Martens,	and	Floridi	2019).	
	
We	argue	that	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information	deserves	to	be	taken	seriously	as	a	
foundation	for	library	and	information	science,	for	a	number	of	reasons,	which	are	set	out	
fully	in	Bawden	and	Robinson	(2018A,	2018B,	2018C).	We	note	six	here:	
	
• The	broad	scope	of	Floridi's	philosophy	matches	the	broadest	interests	of	library	and	
information	science,	and	indeed	goes	beyond	them;	we	can	therefore	be	confident	
that	it	can	serve	as	a	foundation	for	all	library/information	issues.		
	
• Floridi's	information	ethics	addresses	directly	the	concerns	of	the	library/information	
disciplines	and	professions:		privacy,	intellectual	property,	information	access,	
ethical	duties	of	information	providers,	etc.	
	
• Since	philosophy	of	information	is	derived	for	the	specific	context	of	Floridi's	fourth	
(informational)	revolution,	it	is	well	adapted	to	deal	with	the	specific	issues	raised	by	
new	digital	technologies	and	applications.	
	
• Concepts	within	the	philosophy	of	information,	such	as	the	fourth	revolution,	the	
infosphere,	inforgs,	and	onlife,	provide	a	context	and	explanation	for	the	disruptive	
changes	being	experienced	in	the	information	environment.	
	
• Since	Floridi's	approach	is	rooted	in	analytical	philosophy,	it	can	naturally	support	
formal	definitions	and	analyses	for	informational	entities	and	processes.		
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• A	natural	role	for	library/information	professionals	emerges	as	'custodians	of	the	
infosphere',	from	the	consideration	of	ontic	stewardship	as	a	natural	development	of	
the	philosophy	of	information	(Fyffe,	2015;	Van	der	Veer	Martens,	2017).	
	
We	now	turn	to	the	specific	treatment	of	privacy	in	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information.	
	
Privacy	in	Floridi's	philosophy	of	information	
Luciano	Floridi's	concept	of	ontological	information	privacy	have	developed	over	time,	as	a	
part	of	the	development	of	his	information	ethics:	see	inter	alia	Floridi	(2005,	2006,	2011B,	
2013,	2014,	2016,	2017).	They	are	a	rich	and	sophisticated	set	of	concepts,	anchored	in	
Floridi's	broader	philosophy	of	information:	chapter	5	of	Floridi	(2014)	is	the	most	accessible	
introduction.		
	
At	the	risk	of	over-simplification,	we	can	identify	several	general	ideas	that	characterise	a	
Floridian	approach	to	privacy,	which	he	denotes	as	a	'radical	reinterpretation,	one	that	takes	
into	account	the	informational	nature	of	ourselves,	and	of	our	interactions	as	inforgs'	
(Floridi,	2014,	119):	
	
• Various	forms	of	privacy	may	be	identified;	Floridi	(2014)	notes	physical,	mental,	
decisional,	and	informational.	He	regards	informational	as	central,	and	worthy	of	
particular	attention.	This	follows	from	the	idea,	central	in	the	philosophy	of	
information,	that	we	are	informational	organisms,	inforgs:	
	
'Informational	privacy	requires	[a]	radical	re-interpretation,	one	that	takes	
into	account	the	essentially	informational	nature	of	human	beings	and	of	
their	operations	as	social	agents.	Such	re-interpretation	is	achieved	by	
considering	each	individual	as	constituted	by	his	or	her	information,	and	
hence	by	understanding	a	breach	of	one	informational	privacy	as	a	form	of	
aggression	towards	one's	personal	identity'	(Floridi,	2006,	111)	
	
'Only	within	a	philosophy	of	information	that	sees	human	nature	as	
constituted	by	informational	patterns	do	breaches	of	privacy	have	an	
ontological	impact.	If	human	exceptionalism	is	anthropo-eccentrically	based	
on	the	peculiar	status	of	human	beings	as	informational	organisms	
intrinsically	lacking	a	permanent	balance	but	constantly	becoming	
themselves,	like	informational	works	in	progress,	then	a	complete	lack	of	
privacy	is	indeed	dehumanising.'	(Floridi,	2016,	310)	
	
Informational	privacy	may	then	be	explained	in	terms	of	information	accessibility	
within	an	environment,	informational	gap,	informational	(or	ontological)	friction,	
and	information	flow.	
	
• Protection	of	privacy	should	be	identified	as	protection	of	personal	identity	'my	data'	
writes	Floridi	(2016),	is	more	like	'my	hand'	rather	than	'my	car'.	Personal	
information	plays	a	constitutive	role	in	who	I	am	and	who	I	can	become.	In	Floridi's	
ontological	interpretation,	informational	privacy	and	personal	identify	are	
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inextricably	entwined;	in	the	extreme,	complete	lack	of	privacy	means	loss	of	
identity.	'Who	I	can	become'	is	essential:	we	must,	in	practical	terms	relevant	to	
information	providers,	have	the	freedom	to	develop	ourselves	informationally,	by	
reading,	writing,	and	discussing,	without	the	inhibition	of	being	observed	in	so	doing.	
Privacy,	in	this	perspective,	is	not	just	about	stopping	others	from	observing	who	we	
are,	but	equally	of	providing	personal	space	for	us	to	develop	into	who	we	are	
becoming.		
	
• Protection	of	privacy	should	be	based	directly	on	the	protection	of	human	dignity,	
not	indirectly	on	rights,	such	as	those	to	property	or	to	freedom	of	expression.	
Floridi	(2016)	notes	that,	although	it	often	goes	unrecognized,	the	European	Union's	
General	Data	Protection	Regulation	has	human	dignity,	rather	than	human	rights,	at	
its	foundation.	He	writes:	
'Each	of	us,	as	a	beautiful	glitch,	is	a	fragile	and	very	pliable	entity,	whose	life	
is	essentially	made	of	information.	Our	dignity	rests	in	being	able	to	be	the	
masters	of	our	own	journeys,	and	keep	our	identities	and	our	choices	open.	
Any	technology	or	policy	that	tends	to	fix	and	mould	such	openness	risks	
dehumanising	us"	(Floridi,	2016,	310).	
	
• Privacy	ethics	may	be	too	anthropocentric	(considering	only	natural	persons)	and	
also	too	nominalist	(considering	only	individual	persons	and	not	groups).	Groups	
may	be	just	as	valid	an	entity	as	an	individual	in	the	sense	of	being	defined	by	their	
information,	and	hence	just	as	entitled	to	informational	privacy;	indeed,	there	
occasions	when	the	group	is	the	more	natural	holder	of	privacy	rights	than	the	
individual	(Floridi,	2017;	Taylor,	van	der	Sloot	and	Floridi	2017).	These	latter	groups	
may	include,	for	example,	the	ad	hoc	collectives	produced	by	predictive	and	
inferential	artificial	intelligence	in	domains	as	disparate	as	law-enforcement,	
healthcare,	and	retail.	
	
• 'Privacy	is	a	function	of	the	informational	friction	in	the	infosphere.	Any	factor	
increasing	or	decreasing	friction	will	also	affect	privacy'	(Floridi	2014,	105).	The	lower	
the	friction,	the	lower	the	degree	of	informational	privacy	that	can	be	implemented.	
Informational	friction	'refers	here	to	the	forces	that	oppose	the	information	flow	
within	(a	region	of)	the	infosphere	...	to	the	amount	of	work	and	efforts	required	[to]	
obtain,	filter	and/or	block	information'	(Floridi,	2006,	110).	It	is	rather	similar	to,	
though	broader	than,	the	concept	of	'data	friction'	(Bates	2018).	Examples	of	
informational	frictions	are	limited	resources	(time,	computer	power,	access	speeds),	
physical	conditions	(distance,	noise),	inadequate	metadata	and	poor	interfaces,	lack	
of	information	and	digital	literacy,	regulatory	and	copyright	restrictions.		Digital	
technologies,	by	altering	the	nature	of	informational	frictions,	can	both	reinforce	
and	erode	informational	privacy,	depending	how	they	are	applied.	
	
It	seems	to	us	that	Floridi's	privacy	concept	is	a	particularly	valuable	approach	for	analysing	
privacy	issues,	because	of	its	setting	within	philosophy	of	information,	and	specifically	
within	information	ethics,	allows	a	formal	analysis	of	many	relevant	aspects	of	this	complex	
topic.	It	may,	of	course,	be	worthwhile	to	seek	to	combine	it	with	aspects	of	the	other	
relevant	models,	as	will	be	discussed	later.	
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Floridi's	ideas	on	privacy	have	been	critically	evaluated	by,	inter	alia,	Burk	(2008),	Tavani	
(2008B),	Ess	(2009)	and	Mittelstadt	(2017).	However,	few	researchers	have	as	yet	made	
direct	use	of	Floridi's	informational	privacy	concept.	Primiero	(2016)	[see	also	Barn,	Primiero	
and	Barn,	2015]	has	used	four	notions	from	Floridi's	ideas	of	informational	privacy	-	
information	accessibility,	informational	gap,	information	(ontological)	friction,	and	
information	flow	-	as	the	basis	for	developing	a	formal	model	of	privacy	in	a	digital	
environment,	while	a	Masters	thesis	invokes	Floridi's	ideas	of	informational	privacy	to	
analyse	privacy	issues	on	the	Internet,	with	specific	reference	to	cookies,	data	mining,	and	
social	media	use		on	individual	privacy	(Arberg,	2018).	Wu	(2019)	has	noted	Floridi's	(2011B)	
emphasis	on	the	informational	nature	of	personal	identity	in	a	study	of	the	need	for	self-
identity	as	a	factor	affecting	privacy	behaviour	in	the	use	of	social	media.	
	
	
Developing	a	distinctive	approach	to	information	privacy	
Taking	Floridi's	philosophy	as	the	basis	for	dealing	with	current	privacy	concerns	leads	to	
five	major	considerations	to	guide	practical	developments:	
	
• that	each	person	is	constituted	by	their	information,	so	that	informational	privacy	is	
fundamental,	overlaying	all	other	privacy	types.	
	
• that	breach	of	informational	privacy	is	primarily	an	aggression	against	personal	
identity,	and	hence	that	protection	of	privacy	should	be	based	directly	on	the	
protection	of	human	dignity,	not	indirectly	on	rights,	such	as	those	to	property	or	to	
freedom	of	expression.		
	
• that	explicit	protection	for	group	privacy	is	as	important	as	that	for	individual	
privacy.	
	
• that	the	influence	of	digital	technologies	can	both	defend	and	damage	privacy,	and	
can	also	change	our	understanding	of	it	
	
A	good	example	is	the	case	of	'big	data',	which	brings	its	own	particular	set	of	privacy	
challenges,	notable	anonymization	and	data	protection	(Mittelstadt	and	Floridi,	
2016A,	2016B).		
	
Two	privacy-related	concepts	come	to	the	fore	in	the	infosphere:	'anonymity'	and	
'obscurity';	the	terms	are	often	used	essentially	synonymously.	Floridi	(2014)	
reminds	us	that	anonymity,	essentially	the	unavailability	of	personal	data,	due	to	the	
difficulty	of	collecting	and	processing	it,	was,	and	remains,	absent	in	pre-urban	and	
non-urban	societies,	in	which,	putting	it	simplistically,	everyone	in	the	village	knows	
everyone	else's	business.	Urbanisation	in	the	nineteenth	century	brought	a	
considerable	degree	of	anonymity,	but	digital	technologies	have	the	capacity	to	
remove	it;	when	we	lament	the	decline	of	privacy,	we	are	in	many	cases	lamenting	a	
late-Victorian	anonymity.	A	Medium	blog	post	in	April	2019	gives	an	informal,	but	
telling,	account	of	the	loss	of	anonymity	in	even	'anonymized'	data	(Bettilyon,	2019).	
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Obscurity	refers	to	the	situation	in	which	personal	information	has	been	collected	
and	is	in	principle	available,	but	would	require	an	onerous	amount	of	time	and	effort	
to	find	and	use.	Hartzog	and	Stutzman	(2013:	26)	note	that	'Empirical	research	
demonstrates	that	Internet	users	rely	on	obscurity	perhaps	more	than	anything	else	
to	protect	their	privacy.	Yet,	online	obscurity	has	been	largely	ignored	by	courts	and	
lawmakers'.	A	New	York	Times	article	in	April	2019,	on	'why	you	can	no	longer	get	
lost	in	the	crowd',	gave	a	very	clear	description	of	the	loss	of	obscurity	due	to	digital	
technologies,	and	the	role	of	obscurity	in	allowing	the	growth	and	development	of	
individuals,	a	very	Floridian	thought	(Hatzog	and	Selinger,	2019)	
	
Of	the	many	and	varied	digital	technologies	which	threaten	anonymity	and	
obscurity,	those	such	as	edge	computing,	tracking	devices,	life-logging,	and	Internet	
of	Things	may	pose	particular,	and	new,	risks	to	privacy;	see,	for	example,	Wachter	
(2019).	
		
• that	the	key	to	protection	(by	public,	active	and	passive	approaches)	of	privacy	is	the	
control	and	optimisation	of	ontological	(information	and	data)	friction	in	the	
infosphere.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	this	does	not	simply	mean	adding	additional	frictions	to	
slow	down	information	flows,	in	the	hope	that	this	may	support	privacy.	Floridi	
cautions	us	against	any	such	'quick	and	dirty	attempts	...	to	clog	the	infosphere',	by,	
for	example,	banning	certain	operations	on	security	grounds	(Floridi,	2014,	116).	
Such	an	approach,	besides	being	doomed	to	failure,	causes	unacceptable	damage	to	
the	proper	development	of	the	infosphere,	which	relies	on	improving	information	
flows.	Floridi	advocates	instead	a	thoughtful	treatment	on	personal	information,	
based	on	a	proper	analysis	of	privacy.	We	suggest	that	another	approach	may	be	to	
focus	on	the	idea	of	'informational	balance',	in	line	with	the	principles	of	the	Slow	
movement	(Poirier	and	Robinson	2014),	which	may	provide	the	necessary	control	
without	resorting	to	introduction	of	arbitrary	frictions.	
	
With	these	considerations	in	mind,	it	is	tempting	to	develop	a	conceptual	model	for	privacy,	
based	on	Floridi's	principles,	augmented	as	appropriate	by	aspects	of	other	relevant	models.	
This	would	have,	as	components,	elements	such	as:	types	of	privacy;	types	of	harm,	and	
their	solutions;	individuals	and	groups	affected,	and	their	contexts;	informational	frictions,	
anonymity	and	obscurity;	information	accessibility,	informational	gaps,	and	information	
flows.	
		
To	this,	we	might	helpfully	add	elements	from	the	analyses	and	models	of	information	
privacy	noted	earlier.	From	Mai,	we	take	the	essential	point	that	the	processing,	as	well	as	
the	collection,	of	information	as	an	issue	affecting	privacy,	to	be	included	explicitly	in	any	
model	or	framework	for	privacy.	From	Primiero,	we	add	the	ability	to	have	a	formal,	
objective,	quantitative,	and	verifiable	assessment	of	privacy	risks,	harms,	and	solutions;	
other	examples	of	formal	approaches	to	information	privacy,	to	show	the	range	of	
possibilities,	are	given	by	Hansen	(2019)	and	by	Haynes	(2018).	From	Koops	et	al,	we	take	
the	typology	of	privacy,	whose	extra	detail	enhances	Floridi's	ideas.	We	make	the	distinction	
however	that,	whereas	Koops	et	al.	thought	of	informational	privacy	as	a	ninth	privacy	type,	
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overlapping	the	others,	we	take	the	Floridian	viewpoint	that	all	privacy	is	informational,	and	
the	Koops	types	are	varieties	of	informational	privacy.	Nissenbaum	provides	a	set	of	
conceptual	entities	that	enable	us	to	produce	a	model	directly	comparable	with,	or	able	to	
be	integrated	into,	well-known	information	behaviour	models.	And	from	Mulligan,	
Koopman	and	Doty,	we	take	the	idea	that	any	conceptual	model	should	be	sufficiently	
dynamic	as	to	be	adaptable	to	changing	contexts,	particularly	technological.	
	
Interesting	though	the	creation	of	such	a	model	might	be,	we	should	consider	that,	as	
already	noted,	there	are	a	plethora	of	models	and	frameworks	for	privacy,	even	information	
privacy;	and	it	is	notorious	that	there	are	arguably	too	many	conceptual	models	for	
information	behaviour	and	for	information	literacy.	It	is	perhaps	better	to	infuse	these	latter	
with	an	explicit	Floridian	perspective	on	privacy,	augmented	by	the	elements	noted	above;	
emphasising	in	particular	its	contribution	to	individual	and	group	identity	and	development,	
and	of	the	informational	frictions	to	which	a	balance	must	be	found.	
	
None	of	the	well-known	or	widely-applied	information	behaviour	models	have	expressly	
addressed	privacy	issues,	though	it	seems	that	it	should	be	feasible	to	add	this	in.	It	would	
be	interesting	to	consider	a	privacy	extension	to	the	Information	Seeking	and	
Communication	Model,	with	its	explicit	consideration	of	the	relation	between	sender	and	
receiver	of	information	reminiscent	of	Nissenbaum's	approach	(Robson	and	Robinson,	2013,	
2015).	
	
Models	and	frameworks	for	information	and	digital	literacy	have	also	generally	not	included	
explicit	consideration	of	privacy,	although	it	may	be	considered	implicit	in	the	components	
dealing	with	correct	behaviour	online.	Personal	privacy	is	included	within	the	somewhat	all-
embracing	metaliteracy	model	(Mackey	and	Jacobson,	2019).	Privacy	literacy	has	been	
discussed	as	a	concept	overlapping	with,	though	distinct	from,	digital	literacy	(Wissinger,	
2017).	It	may	be	that	the	best	way	forward	would	be	to	integrate	the	privacy	perspective	
proposed	here	into	a	metaliteracy	model;	the	idea	of	privacy	for	personal	development	
would	fit	well	with	the	metaliteracy	concept.	
		
Conclusions	
Floridi's	conception	of	privacy,	within	his	philosophy	of	information,	offers,	in	our	view,	the	
best	basis	for	developing	information	privacy	as	a	field	of	research,	study,	and	practice	
within	the	library/information	disciplines	and	professions.	This	is	an	example	of	the	explicit	
adoption	of	theoretical	frameworks	as	a	basis	for	education	and	practice	which	we	believe	
are	essential	for	the	development	of	the	information	sciences	
	
We	make	three	suggestions	for	research	which	could	take	this	idea	forward:	formulate	well-
known	informational	privacy	issues	in	terms	of	Floridi's	conception,	to	assess	its	value;	
introduce	information	privacy	concepts	into	models	of	information	behaviour	and	
information	literacy;	and	investigate	quantitative	and	semi-quantitative	privacy	modelling,	
based	on	a	formal	analysis	of	informational	frictions.	
	
We	also	suggest	that	some	of	the	concepts	discussed	here	-	centrality	of	human	dignity,	
respect	for	both	individuals	and	groups,	balancing	of	informational	frictions,	and	the	value	
of	anonymity	and	obscurity	for	individual	development	-	may	have	a	significance	beyond	the	
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immediate	issues	associated	with	privacy,	and	may	be	important	for	the	information	
professions	more	generally.	
		
Finally,	it	is	worth	saying	that	Floridi's	philosophical	vision	is	a	very	positive,	and	indeed	
inspirational	one,	and	this	should	count	for	something	in	assessing	its	value	as	a	basis	for	
the	treatment	of	the	important	and	sensitive	issue	of	privacy	in	the	library/information	
sciences:	
	
'Nature's	beautiful	glitches	...	stewards	of	Being	[with	an]	unclear	destiny	[in	
their]	moral	struggle	against	entropy	...	a	thin	red	line	against	the	vandalism	
of	time'	(Floridi,	2019,	99-100)	
	
'in	terms	of	privacy	...	the	respect	of	each	other's	personal	information	does	
not	have	to	lead	to	a	world	of	solipsistic	lives,	it	can	be	the	basis	of	a	society	
that	promotes	the	value	of	relations	as	something	to	which	those	who	are	
related	wilfully	and	fruitfully	contribute		(Floridi,	2016,	311).	
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